Everything that starts with E ...

...government: They should have ‘done everything in their power’ to support their ‘ally’ . Indeed many historians, at least in the short to medium term, agree that it was the Americans that provoked Nasser. US Secretary for State John Foster Dulles decided on July 19th that American aid for the Aswan damn was to be withdrawn, which was a direct factor in the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. Townend Hoopes, in his much appraised ...
...rather irrational and even ignorant decision process Dulles went through. Returning from Egypt, the President of the World Bank Eugene Black made the point to Dulles that Egypt, citing statistics, that Egypt would be able to handle the Aswan damn project. Hoopes reports: Dulles said “I just don't know… whether we should go through with this or not.” Black acknowledged that the project was difficult and large… but that the…Dam ... more

EDEN - the cause of Suez?

Overview

The Suez Crisis, also referred to as the 'Tripartite Invasion', was an attack on Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel in late October 1956. It followed Egypt's - specifically their new Presidednt, General Nasser's - decision to nationalise the Suez Canal. It marks a huge turning-point in British foreign and colonial policy.

The Suez Canal is a canal between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. It was designed by British and French architects and built by Egyptian workers. It opened in 1869. Essential as a Western trade route, Egypt's nationalisation of it (it had previously been under French and British control) sparked huge chaos.

In this review, I'm going to investigate the reasons why Britain was left with little alternative other than to co-conspire with France and Israel to plan a secret attack on Egypt in October 1956 so as to regain the Suez Canal. I will explore the commonly held view that Anthony Eden’s misjudgements were the most important factor in causing what Harold Macmillan referred to as the ‘Suez debacle’. I will do so from his perspective; analysing the decisions he took. This will be compared to the acts and works of the Americans and the Egyptians, as well as other long-term factors. (If you are struggling to keep up with who's who, there's an index at the end of the reivew with a brief summary of the main 'characters'.)

Peter Wilby calls Eden’s premiership a ‘tragedy’ , and Andrew Marr goes as far as saying that had it not been for Suez, Eden may have been one of our finest Prime Ministers. There still remains much debate whether Eden should be held responsible for the Suez crisis - whether the onus and emphasis should be placed on his misjudgements.

The most significant element on Eden’s part is the way he viewed General Gamel Abdul Nasser, President of Egypt. He compared Nasser to Mussolini and Hitler, who he refers to as ‘megalomaniacal’ dictators . In a letter to President Eisenhower, Eden refers back to the 1930s, comparing Hitler’s foreign expansions into the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and so forth to Nasser’s capture of Suez: ‘Similarly, the seizure of the Suez Canal is… the opening gambit in a planned campaign by Nasser ’. Eden even likens Nasser’s book to a ‘potted edition of ‘Mein Kampf’.

As he makes clear in his autobiography, Eden believed that he could have saved ‘millions of lives’ had he taken action and forced Hitler to withdraw from the Rhineland. Peter Hennessey writes: ‘it is clear that, for all the rest of his…political career, Eden was scarred…by guilt for his inaction over the Rhineland.’ It is, of course, very difficult to know what Eden was thinking; only he himself can fully understand his reasoning. Yet in likening Nasser to Hitler, I believe Eden felt he had to act against Nasser; he was not going to appease a brutal dictator again. This is reflected in his almost obstinate nature in which he eventually began to pursue military action against the Egyptians. Hence one could argue that it was this determination and the effect of past experiences on Eden that was the main reason for the culmination of the Suez Crisis in late 1956.

Anthony Nutting, who was a Minister in the Foreign Office at the time, is often quoted about Eden’s handling of the crisis. 30 years after the crisis, he recalled a telephone conversation he had with Eden: ‘Why can’t you get it in your head I want the man destroyed? ... I don’t care if there is anarchy and chaos in Egypt…get rid of Nasser. ’ Clearly not the frame of mind one would expect in the most polished political diplomat of his generation. From this extract, it comes across as if Eden had taken a personal battle with Nasser on himself – one senses the intense rivalry between the two. However, the reliability of this quote must be examined. How Anthony Nutting managed to, word-perfectly, quote a conversation almost thirty years after it took place is exceedingly strange. However, if it is an accurate representation of Eden’s stance on the issue, one can safely say he is a major, if not the main reason for the Suez Crisis, as it seems as thought right from the outset he was not interested in a peaceful solution.

Peter Wilby, in his short history Eden, criticizes his approach. He says that Eden “was, as so often in his life, vacillating” . (The inclusion of “as so often in his life” epitomizes Wilby’s take on Eden – one of disapproval.) While “his criteria for satisfaction [for a settlement to the dispute] were vigorous” , he also wanted “specific and immediate proposals from the Egyptians”, i.e. a quick fix to the problem. Wilby forwards the argument that it was Eden’s rigid and hard-nosed demands that led to the tri-partite agreement being hatched; the zenith of the Suez crisis. He references Eden himself in this argument, talking about “our dirty plans” . Wilby almost, unlike nearly all other mainstream historians, only puts all the blame on Eden, holding him highly accountable. His book was published in 2006, at a time when mainstream revisionist history put less emphasis on Eden’s role and potential mistakes. Revisionist accounts defend Eden’s attempts to preserve the empire and Britain’s global interests. He is well-known as a left wing political journalist, seeing Conservative policy as there to be challenged – conservative imperialism would no doubt be part of this, and Eden’s passionate attempts to preserve Britain’s empire would not be viewed in a good light by Wilby. His critique therefore can be assumed to be to challenge the status quo accepted views and provide a left wing perspective, which is what his account provides.

However he does, at times, in what is a largely critical analysis, defend the former Prime Minister. He argues if a ‘satisfactory settlement had been available there he would have taken it’. To paraphrase, Wilby accounts that Eden was stuck between a rock and a hard place: he could not allow Nasser a ‘face-saving formula’; he could not allow the Soviets to form an alliance with a rebellious Egypt; the French were impatient; the Conservative Party were in ‘bellicose mood’ and Harold MacMillan had made a ‘fairly clear, though reasonably polite threat to resign’ . With all these considerations, Eden was in no easy position. It is hard to blame a man put in this position, who after all, was not the reason for the crisis in the first place.

It would be the Americans who must take on this blame. In recent times, revisionist historians are placing more and more emphasis on America’s actions in the build-up to the Suez crisis. Even Eden himself, in what is an undoubtedly irate outburst, heavily criticises the actions (or lack of) of the American government: They should have ‘done everything in their power’ to support their ‘ally’ . Indeed many historians, at least in the short to medium term, agree that it was the Americans that provoked Nasser. US Secretary for State John Foster Dulles decided on July 19th that American aid for the Aswan damn was to be withdrawn, which was a direct factor in the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. Townend Hoopes, in his much appraised book The Devil and John Foster Dulles, talks of the rather irrational and even ignorant decision process Dulles went through. Returning from Egypt, the President of the World Bank Eugene Black made the point to Dulles that Egypt, citing statistics, that Egypt would be able to handle the Aswan damn project. Hoopes reports: Dulles said “I just don't know… whether we should go through with this or not.” Black acknowledged that the project was difficult and large… but that the…Dam was an important project for the Egyptians … [Black was] afraid “all hell might break loose” if the American offer were terminated’. Dulles, without saying another word, left the room . Hoopes says ‘It was as though Dulles had turned off his hearing aid. ” Nasser hoped to build a high dam south of Aswan on the Nile, which, it was hoped, would end forever Egypt's poverty. It was a mammoth project and the keystone of his popularity. By the energy generated by that dam and the irrigation that it would make possible, Egypt, he said, would recapture the greatness of its ancient past. But it would take time and vast amount of money, which the nation lacked. Hoopes makes the point that Dulles’ decision was narrow-minded and ill-informed, as the exchange above conveys. Hoopes himself has extensive foreign affairs experience, with first hand US foreign policy insight from the 1940s to 1960s, working as staff aide to three Secretaries of Defence (James Forrestal, General Marshall and Robert Lovett), as the partner of an international consulting firm, and as Principal Deputy for International Security Affairs at the Pentagon. His views therefore on Dulles carry weight.

The gravity of Dulles’s decision to withdraw the loan is well conveyed by Andrew Marr: ‘John Foster Dulles abruptly cancelled the offer (for the dam). Nasser was livid. To show his anger and to find a new and secure source of revenue, he abruptly retaliated by seizing control of the Suez Canal.’ Marr, writing in the 21st Century, with the benefit of hindsight and a greater amount of access to historical sources, directly correlates Dulles’ illogical decision to the crisis. Even WN Medlicott, writing in 1967, at a time when the general historical consensus is generally softer on the Americans, recognizes the magnitude of Dulles’ decision: (The American government) ‘acted without considering any of the political implications of these ostensibly economic questions.’ There is continuity between what Medlicott and, writing 40 years later, Marr, say about the consequences of America’s decision: it directly led to the nationalisation of Suez, and hence the crisis. Britain’s and America’s combined withdrawing of over $70million gave Nasser an excuse he much desired to bring the canal under Egyptian ownership, arguing it would give Egypt the ability to plug the financial gap formed by Dulles’ naïve decision.

In what is widely agreed to be a mistake on the part of the Americans, they did little to rectify the situation. ‘Since Nasser’s act had been provoked by Washington, and since his revenge hurt Britain and France, Washington’s allies, it might have been expected that Eisenhower would staunchly back action against Nasser.’ However, the US offered inconsistent aid to Britain when it was most needed, a point Eden himself reiterates: It was ‘never the attitude’ of the United States Government to ease the situation, rather they ‘coasted along over difficulties as they arose and improvised policies, each following on the failure of its immediate predecessor. None of these was geared to the long-term purpose of serving a joint cause.’ There is good reason to suggest this claim made by Eden should be taken with a pinch of salt. Eden’s autobiography was published in 1960, at a time when his popularity was at its lowest ebb. One could claim Eden’s biography is inherently biased and hence unreliable; it is merely Eden seeking to justify himself and restore his reputation. However, Medlicott writes: ‘Sir Anthony Eden’s own account has been given with every appearance of frankness in his memoirs’. His analysis remains a valid interpretation.

Medlicott also accounts how negations were ‘accompanied by public assurances that no United States Ship would be required to ‘shoot its way’ through the canal.’ Eisenhower and Dulles insisted that a peaceful solution should be found. By saying that America would have no part in trying to ‘shoot our way through’ to the canal, and by referring to the problem of colonialism, they encouraged Nasser, who brusquely rejected all initiatives. Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s stubbornness to avoid confrontation at all costs seems rather odd considering just over a year before Eisenhower had asked Congress for permission to use force against mainland China for the protection of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores. Medlicott asks the question – ‘Did not the forcible seizure of the canal by Nasser threaten British and French interests more immediate than the American interest in Quesmoy?’ In effect, as Eden argued in his memoirs, Dulles was saying the Egyptians had nothing to fear. He added: ‘Such cynicism towards allies destroys true partnership’ America’s total lack of support is fully evident.

‘I really do not see’, the President told the Prime Minister, ‘how a successful result could be achieved by forcible means’ Even in private correspondence between Eden and Eisenhower, not written for the public’s eye, and hence, to some extent, more reliable in that sense, one can sense the concern on the American side, for which there are a number of reasons. Possibly the most prominent of which was that in 1956 President Eisenhower was vying to be re-elected on a ‘peace and prosperity’ ticket. It clearly wasn’t in his best interests to get involved with a Middle Eastern brawl. Moreover, the Suez Canal was of little direct importance to the US. ‘The canal was the conduit for three quarters of Western Europe’s oil… (while) the Americans depended on it to a far lesser extent.’ The American historian John Spanier writes America’s anti-military force stance was what ‘saved Nasser’. He has no qualms about criticising his compatriots: the Eisenhower administration had first ‘pressurised Britain to sign the Anglo-Egyptian treaty’ (forcing Britain to withdraw its forces), then withdrew the Aswan Dam offer, which ‘precipitated Nasser’s seizure of the canal and the British attack’ and even further ‘opposed the use of force to settle this issue.’ Spanier traces the consequences of America’s decision making throughout. He even makes the point that all decisions were made in a selfish light. The administration’s decision to oppose the invasion was America’s ‘golden opportunity to win Egyptian and Arab friendship’. To prove to ‘the Arabs that the United States were not pro-Jewish (pro-Israeli)… that the country could even be pro-Arab… By saving Nasser, the United States could align itself with Arab nationalism; supporting Britain, France and Israel would have left the Soviet Union as the sole champion of Arab aspirations.’ In short, Eisenhower and Dulles were able to identify themselves with any anti-colonialist, anti-Israeli and nationalistic elements in the Arab world. In this way, America’s political, economic and strategic power in the region would not only be safeguarded, but enhanced. Spanier identifies a number of long-term factors for America’s strong opposition to action over Suez: the Cold War, and America’s strong attempts to make sure Soviet influence in the region was curbed; America’s interests in the region; rectifying broken relationships with the Arab world which had formed with the fashioning of Israel; and anti-colonialism. The Suez crisis became a political game for the Americans; they utilised the crisis to their advantage.

Much later, according to the then Vice President, Richard Nixon, Eisenhower had second thoughts about Suez, calling his decision to crush Britain his biggest foreign policy mistake. Even Dulles, desperately ill in hospital with cancer, said that he reckoned he had been wrong over Suez too. It is clear that the American government had a very detrimental input into the Suez crisis.

However, there is an aspect which can be attributed as being more important than any of the listed factors. The long-term background factors of tense colonialism and the growth of Arab Nationalism post World War II, one could argue, meant that a crisis was always inevitable, regardless of the short to medium term actions of Eden, Eisenhower or Nasser. This view is advocated by a number of historians and political commentators, particularly of late.

‘Suez was about Britain’s colonial history. On the British side, Suez was an integral part of the empire. During the Second World War, it was the centre of the fight against Rommel’s Africa Corps, around which the Britain’s domination of the Middle East revolved. Indeed, Eden referred to the canal as the ‘swing door of the British Empire, which has got to keep continually revolving’ . Egypt was a hub, around which a quarter of Britain’s imports arrive, where airplanes refilled, and Britain’s Middle Eastern pivot. To Egypt, the British and French were usurpers of their land – a feeling that stretched back to the late 17th Century. Marr comments that Eden ‘was at root an intensely patriotic man, who thought Britain’s Commonwealth links far more important than deeper entanglements with Europe’ and Thorpe calls him a ‘patriotic defender of British interests.’ Nasser, on the other hand, ‘was the original of the anti-colonialist autocrat… driving the British from Egypt was the cause that burned in him from his teenage years’ . This was not just a fundamental difference between two leaders – it is representative of the bad feeling fostered between the two nations over decades – the struggle between Arab nationalism and British imperialism. Specifically, the canal was built by French engineers using French and English money. Since 1888, Suez had been administered by international facilities, not an Egyptian one. Marr comments: ‘it was not hard to see how this streak of colonial-owned internationalism running through Egypt felt like a violation .’ It was always going to come to a head, as it did in the 1950s. The Suez tug-of-war, I would argue, was beyond personalities and individuals – it was about nations and their identities. Eden was prepared to ‘go down against Egypt with all flags flying rather than submit to the Suez despoliation’ , while Nasser was fighting for his country’s individualism.

The mainstream immediately post-Suez held view was that Eden was the chief culprit in allowing the crisis to occur. To some extent, I can see where view is coming from. I would indeed attribute blame to Eden for his unwise move to allow British policy to drift from America’s, Britain’s strongest and most influential ally. He took a hard line view on Nasser, drawing from his own past experiences, which, combined with Nasser’s own vociferous and passionate patriotism could mean that a confrontation was inevitable. One could argue that Eden was too uncompromising and perhaps should have drawn on his considerable political experience to end the issue diplomatically, rather than, as Nutting’s account illustrate, allowing his emotions to get in the way. In this sense I would attribute blame on Eden’s shoulders. My title reads Eden’s misjudgements were the “main” reason for the crisis. However, my investigations, and particularly the accounts of revisionist historians, writing with the release of previously secret documents, lead me to believe that his misjudgements were not the main cause of Suez. I believe the long term factor of colonialism and imperialism, which directly conflicted with Arab nationalism, meant that a conflict was inevitable. Eden and Nasser, both extremely patriotic figures, did their bit to stir these factors up, but the blame cannot be solely attributed to either one of them. Tensions had been building up for decades, right up until the Suez calamity in the summer of 1956, for which Eden should not be held liable. Moreover, the selfish moves made by the Americans did not ease matters, and in particular Dulles’ decision to withdraw the Aswan Dam loan, which proved to be a hasty move. The selfish and somewhat egocentric standpoint adopted by the Eisenhower administration - particularly in view of the upcoming election - did nothing to help Eden’s cause. Weighing up the balance of each factor, I believe the American’s (in the medium to short term) and the conflict between colonialism and nationalism (in the long term) are the most important factors as they contributed most to what started the crisis. While Eden can be attributed with some blame in the short term, I do not believe his misjudgements were the main reason for the Suez crisis.

I hope you found that insightful, and must take this oppurtunity to congratulate you on reaching the end!

Main figures

* Anthony Eden: British Prime Minister 1955-57, former Foreign Secretary and devout colonialist who 'led the charge' on Egypt.

* General Gamel Abdel Nasser: Egyptian President 1956-70 and Arab nationalist who declared the Suez Canal to be Egyptian property.

* President Einhower: 34th US President 1953-61 who was in the middle of his re-election campaign at the time.

* Anthony Nutting: Foreign Office Minister who wrote a detailed account of the events after resigning his post.

* John Foster Dulles: US Secretary of State under President Dwight D. Eisenhower from 1953 to 1959.

* Harold MacMillan: Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time and replaced Eden as Prime Minister in 1957.

Bibliography

- Peter Hennessy, The Prime Ministers Volume Two
- Andrew Marr, A History Of Modern Britain,
- D.R. Thorpe, Eden
- WN Medlicott, Contemporary England
- Anthony Eden, Full Circle
- Alan Sked and Chris Cook, A Political History 1945-1992
- John Spanier, America’s Foreign Policy Since World War II
- John Dumbrell, The Making of US Foreign Policy
- Townend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles `
- Neil Hart, The Foreign Secretary
- Ben Vessey, History Review, March 2004, Pen Portraits: Anthony Eden
- http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6085264.stm
- http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/5199392.stm
- http://www.spartacus.s choolnet.co.uk/COLDsuez.htm 

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